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The Epistemic Superiority of Experiment to Simulation1 
 
 
If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon. Not 
merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system 
of physics forbids us to believe it. For this demands answers to the questions “How did he overcome 
the force of gravity?” “How could he live without an atmosphere?” and a thousand others which 
could not be answered. – Ludwig Wittgenstein, c. 1950 (published 1969) 
 
Somewhere something incredible is waiting to be known. – Carl Sagan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper defends the naïve thesis that the method of experiment is epistemically superior to 
the method of simulation, other things equal, a view that has been rejected by some 
philosophers writing about simulation, and whose grounds have been hard to pin down by its 
defenders. There are three challenges I take on in defending this thesis. One is to say how 
“other things equal” can be defined, another to identify and explain the source of the 
epistemic advantage of experiment in a hypothetical comparison so defined. Finally, I 
explain why this theoretical point matters since practical constraints like feasibility and 
morality mean that scientists do not often face an other-things-equal comparison when they 
choose between experiment and computer simulation (hereafter “simulation”). 
 
2.  TWO METHODS 
There is a persistent intuition that experiments are more direct than simulations, that they are 
in a more direct relationship to the object of study, the material world.  This intuition surely 
has a role in the concern that has been expressed among some experimental physicists that 
                                                             
1 I would like to thank XXX for helpful discussions of this material. 
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simulations will come to be preferred because they are generally cheaper, and that this will 
inhibit discovery of new facts about the world (Humphreys 2004, 133-134). After all, a 
simulation can only reveal the consequences of knowledge we already possess, or, as Herbert 
Simon put it, “a simulation is no better than the assumptions built into it” (Simon, 1969, 18). 
 
This latter intuition is supported by an idea that a computer simulation is merely 
calculating the consequences of a set of theoretical assumptions. There would thus be no 
information in the results of the simulation that were not already present in the theoretical 
assumptions – garbage in, garbage out. However there are two problems with this idea. First, 
the fact that information is present in theoretical assumptions does not mean that we know it 
is, so even if a simulation is merely calculating, it is giving us new knowledge. One could 
protest that the epistemic status of the new beliefs we form is no better than that of the theory 
since it has no grounds independent of our trust in the theory. However, in fact a computer 
simulation’s results do have sources independent of the theory, since it is a long road from 
theoretical assumptions to a “solver,” the computer program that will give the final results 
(Morgan 2002, 2003, 2005; Humphreys 2004; Winsberg 2010). The solver is the product of 
theoretical ideas, approximation, replacement, and computational lock-in, ingenuity, and 
necessity. It has “a life of its own” and an independent epistemic status; its credentials are 
evaluated independently of the theory and it is typically the solver, not the theory, that is 
revised when predictions resulting from a simulation face recalcitrant experience. This 
independence of evaluation is the second problem with viewing a simulation as merely 
calculating the consequences of a theory. 
If a simulation has enough distance from the theoretical assumptions to give it an 
independent status, perhaps the difference between simulation and experiment can be located 
in the former having too much distance from the target system, the part of the world that the 
two methods can be used to instruct us about. On one such view, whereas in an old-fashioned 
experiment one is “controlling the actual object of interest, …, in a simulation one is 
experimenting with a model rather than the phenomenon itself.” (Gilbert and Troitzsch 1999) 
An immediate problem with this view is that the actual object of interest of a scientist 
conducting an old-fashioned experiment to test a hypothesis often extends beyond the sample 
that can be manipulated in the lab. Ernest Rutherford wanted to use an experiment on a gold 
sample to draw a conclusion about the structure of all atoms, not only those in other samples 
of gold, but also in lead, and hydrogen, and phosphorus. A model may be thought to be 
farther from the world insofar as in order to draw conclusions about the world from it one 
must make assumptions as to its similarities to the target system. But as evident to us as it 
may be, the claims that this gold is similar to all other gold and to lead, and hydrogen, and 
phosphorus, in the relevant respects are also assumptions that must have been justified if the 
results on this gold are to be generalized to all atoms. In both simulations and experiments 
the object acted upon is separated from the world to be learned about by a layer of 
assumptions of relevant similarity (Parker 2005, Winsberg 2009, 2010). 
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Another way of attempting to make out the intuition that experiment is more direct 
than simulation focuses on the kind of similarity that obtains between study system and target 
system. A gold sample is materially similar to all other gold, and to lead, hydrogen, and 
phosphorus, in the relevant respects, whereas a computer model is similar to the target 
system only in virtue of its form (Morgan 2002, 2003, 2005; Guala 2005). We can surely 
grant that there is a continuum with material, associated with experiment, on one end, and 
formal, associated with (computer) simulation, on the other. And though a computer model 
may have a similarity of functional organization to all gold and other atoms, and the 
program’s instantiation in hardware may follow relevantly similar dynamical rules of 
evolution, no hardware we currently imagine will ever be as materially similar to all gold as a 
sample of gold is. If we thought it were, we would likely think twice about calling the system 
a simulation. 
But while a material/formal, experiment/simulation continuum tracks something in 
our usage of the words, the purpose of these two methods is to learn things about the world, 
so the challenge for this view is to explain why the distinction between material and formal 
similarity makes any principled epistemological difference. As I have said, a claim of 
material similarity does not come for free but depends on background knowledge or 
assumptions. Moreover, even if we grant that material similarity will bring strictly more 
similarity than formal similarity will, because relevant material similarity will include formal 
or dynamical similarity, one must still say why that additional similarity makes an epistemic 
difference.  
Several authors claim that material similarity is always relevant: 
We are more justified in claiming to learn something about the world from the 
experiment because the world and experiment share the same stuff. In contrast, 
inference from the model experiment is much more difficult as the materials are not 
the same – there is no shared ontology, and so the epistemological power is weaker. 
(Morgan 2005, 323; cf. Guala 2002, 2005; Harré 2003, 27-8.) 
 
but the claim that “ontological equivalence provides epistemological power” (Morgan 2005, 
326) gives no guidance as to why the extra similarity always matters to justification. The 
proposal is that material similarity makes it easier to justify any claim of relevant similarity. 
However, this puts the cart before the horse, for the claim of material similarity itself requires 
justification. Material similarity does not give a metric for epistemically relevant similarity 
between the study and target systems because establishing such similarity itself adds a layer 
of epistemic distance, which could in principle be of any length, and material similarity is not 
necessarily easier to establish than formal similarity. 
However, there is a sense in which similarity of material can let the experimentalist 
get away with less than the simulationist, that is well explained by Francesco Guala (2005), 
and a version of which is endorsed by Eric Winsberg (2010, 64-69). Both experimentalist and 
simulationist must insure that their study systems are dynamically similar to the target 
2016 Quad Fellows  S. Roush 
system. The simulationist does this by making in her study system a model of the dynamics 
of the target system. The experimentalist can circumvent the need to make a model of the 
dynamics of the target system if she has reason to believe the study sample and target system 
are materially similar, because dynamical similarity can be inferred from that material 
similarity. Rutherford could suppose that this gold behaves like all other gold in the relevant 
respects – whatever they are – because they all are gold. Of course that claim of material 
similarity must be justified, but the simulationist must go further, to make specific 
commitments about what the dynamics of the target system are – commitments that can be 
avoided and black-boxed in an experiment – and the simulationist will have no material 
similarity at all to appeal to. Thus the simulationist seems to be strictly further out on a limb. 
This contrast plays a role in what I will argue is the superiority of experiment to simulation, 
although I will not take the contrast to rest essentially on the material vs. formal distinction. 
 
3.  OTHER THINGS EQUAL 
Margaret Morrison, Wendy Parker, and Eric Winsberg (Morrison 2009, Parker 2009, 
Winsberg 2009) have denied that the difference between material and formal similarity has 
epistemic significance per se, and that experiment is a superior method. In partial support of 
these claims, Parker and Winsberg point out that some simulations are better than the 
experiments that we are able to do in pursuit of the same question, despite the fact that the 
experiments would be much more materially similar, for example, same-stuff models of 
weather and same-stuff models of black holes (Parker 2009, 492; Winsberg 2010, 61). 
However, this point is not probative for two reasons. One is the qualification to experiments 
that we are able to do. That there are questions for which the simulation we are able to do is 
more reliable than any experiment we can do gives no reason to deny the superiority of a 
comparable experiment that we cannot do. Methods can often be compared even when they 
cannot be carried out, and the superiority claimed here is epistemic, not pragmatic.  
Secondly, in order to isolate the difference that being an experiment or a simulation 
makes we must compare the two methods other things equal. Parker recognizes this but 
despairs of defining this phrase in the current context since it seems impossible to make the 
““same” intervention or make the “same” observations in two experiments in which the 
systems being intervened on and observed are quite different in material and structure” 
(Parker 2009, 492). However, the equality needed is not material or structural; it is epistemic. 
And equality is needed only for those properties that do not distinguish an experiment and a 
simulation. My procedure for setting up an other-things-equal comparison will be first to 
identify as many general similarities as possible between the two methods and thereby close 
in on the differences by elimination. Then, the difference that will be the basis for an 
argument for the superiority of experiment will emerge when we take an actual experiment 
and constructively imagine the best possible simulation for addressing the same question, 
that is similar to the experiment in every possible epistemic way.  
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In the other-things-equal comparison, the two studies must be aiming to answer the 
same question. Even beyond this, for all their material and structural differences, the methods 
of experiment and simulation are remarkably similar epistemically, in ways that Parker and 
Winsberg have brought out. Both methods in the uses I am focused on employ a stand-in, a 
study system whose results are to be generalized to a target system. In both cases the 
justification for that generalization goes by way of establishing relevant similarity between 
the study and target systems, of whatever sort, by whatever means. Both experiments and 
simulations are run. That is, they are dynamical processes initiated by the functional 
equivalent of an ON switch. In both experiment and computer simulation these processes are 
concrete. In experiment this is obvious; for example, Rutherford’s alpha particles are shot at 
thin gold foil and follow a trajectory dictated by physical law. In computer simulation, the 
process is a computation governed by dynamical laws encoded in a program. A computation 
is a physical process. That is, in perfect analogy to an experiment the computer program 
constitutes a set of dynamical laws that govern the time evolution of hunks of hardware, 
typically made of silicon. A program is an abstract entity, but so are the laws of physics. 
What both sets of laws govern are concrete processes. Both methods are interventions in a 
broad sense. When the switch is flipped on, an initial state – whether this is flying alpha 
particles and a sheet of gold, or numerical inputs and their associated silicon – is set free to 
do its work according to the laws. 
Both kinds of studies have outputs at the end of the process that are typically called 
“data”, and in both methods the data must be interpreted in order to have results. To do this, 
one must verify that the intended intervention (physical process, computation) was actually 
performed, that the data actually reports the desired quantity, and that control for irrelevant 
factors was achieved. Debugging a program is epistemically analogous to tinkering with a 
concrete experimental apparatus to make it intervene or measure as intended. In both 
methods, the claim that the apparatus or program does what is intended is verified by 
benchmarking, that is, comparing the results to known endpoint values, and to the results of 
other studies. Results so certified can be used to justify conclusions about the target system, 
provided a claim of relevant similarity between study- and target- system is justified.  
So far the many similarities between the two methods. The epistemic difference is 
best developed through an example. Folklore suggests that Rutherford’s 1911 paper that 
explained a variety of scattering results via a nuclear model of the atom was decisive. 
Though this was not true historically or substantively (Heilbron 1968), the experiments by 
Hans Geiger and Ernest Marsden (Geiger and Marsden 1909, Geiger 1910) showing back 
deflection of alpha particles which are remembered as particularly well-handled by 
Rutherford’s nuclear interpretation provide examples of a comprehensible and significant 
type of experiment. It answered the clear question what the deflection pattern of alpha 
particles shot at metal foil a few atoms thick was. At the time of Rutherford’s nuclear 
interpretation, physicists knew about electrons, their mass and single negative charge, and 
that the atom was electrically neutral, and so, that because it contained electrons the atom 
must also contain positive charge. However, they did not know how the positive charge was 
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distributed. J.J. Thomson’s “plum-pudding” model dominated, and in this picture the positive 
charge was uniformly distributed over the atom.  
In the folklore version of the story, the fact that alpha particles were scattered through 
a wide angle when they were shot at a very thin metal foil, and even sometimes deflected all 
the way back, could only be explained by supposing the atom had a nucleus, because 
otherwise nothing in the atom would have enough density or charge to deflect the hefty alpha 
particle that strongly. In the true version, this experiment, even when combined with all of 
the other scattering phenomena Rutherford’s model could explain, was not taken to be 
decisive, in part because investigation of the atom via scattering had multiple unknowns 
concerning the structure of the atom, and the scattering properties of the projectiles. Other 
aspects of the structure of the atom than the distribution of its matter and charge also affected 
how it would scatter alpha particles. For example, Thomson’s model, which had only 
compound scattering, could explain the back deflection if the radius of the atom as a whole 
was exceedingly tiny, and while Rutherford evidently thought this was implausible, atomic 
radii had not yet been measured.2   
To see the difference between one of the alpha-scattering experiments and an other-
things-equal simulation it is helpful to distinguish knowns and unknowns in the former. 
Many relevant matters in addition to those listed above were already settled. In addition to 
knowing the mass and charge of electrons, they knew that alpha particles were helium atoms 
stripped of their electrons and having a +2 charge, and experimenters had the ability to 
collimate beams of them to shoot at very high speed at small targets, and to make a foil thin 
enough that an alpha should be meeting atoms only a few at a time. By the time of 
Rutherford’s interpretation, atoms were known to have a number of electrons that was, 
conservatively, no more than ten times the atomic weight of the atom, a matter highly 
relevant to whether electrons sprinkled over the atom would have the heft to deflect an alpha 
strongly. 
The first step to constructing a simulation that is epistemically equal to an alpha-
scattering experiment is to take all of the things the experimenters knew and did not know 
and suppose that the simulationist has the same epistemic status toward those matters. The 
simulationist knows those things the experimenter knows, so, ideally, she can program her 
model to fulfill them, to work the same way. For example, she will have simulacra alphas 
with the right “charge” properties, where that means they respond to simulacra negative 
charge by changing the analog of their positions in the way that physical charges do, 
according to the Coulomb force. 
                                                             
2 Rutherford was proposing a model that included multiple innovations: a nucleus, treatment of the alpha as a 
point mass, and single collisions rather only compound scattering. Thus, despite his obvious confidence, his 
argument took the form of an inference to the simplest explanation of a variety of experimental results, rather 
than a direct argument that his was the only possible explanation. After his 1911 paper was largely ignored he 
recognized that he would not persuade his colleagues until he derived and tested radioactive, chemical, and 
spectroscopic predictions of his model. Maybe folklore forgets this period of obscurity for his nuclear 
hypothesis because it was so short. Rutherford got the project of deriving further predictions started soon after 
when Niels Bohr joined him in Manchester in 1912 (Heilbron 1968, 300-305). 
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The key question in constructing this simulation is what we are to do about the 
experimenter’s unknowns. Experimenters did not know the radius of the atom, its distribution 
of positive charge, or number of electrons, among other things. These unknown matters play 
a role in determining the deflection pattern for alpha particles, and do so without becoming 
known in the process. When alphas are shot at thin gold foil something happens in the foil 
and consequently to a semi-circle scintillation screen surrounding the foil, which records the 
hits and yields the raw data of where the alphas landed, and the experimenters do not need to 
know the structure of the atom in order for this evolution to occur, or in order to interpret the 
results as wide-angle deflection of alphas by atoms. In the simulation there has to be an 
analogous computation or evolution, yielding numbers as data. What should that part of the 
program look like, and what will the programming decisions be based on? Assumptions will 
need to be incorporated corresponding to the structure of the atom. Otherwise there will 
simply be no data about what an “alpha” does in response to an “atom.” 
No experimenter at the time could be confident about these features of the atom, so 
the other-things-equal simulationist cannot piggy-back on them. An arbitrary choice about 
them would make the data resulting from the simulation meaningless. One could program 
multiple simulations based on a variety of different hypotheses about atomic structure, and 
this would be a fine thing, but this would be equivalent to what Rutherford and Thomson did 
in constructing their models and determining what followed from them mathematically. 
Those types of calculations were not experiments, and could give no answer at all to what 
alphas actually will do when shot at a thin metal foil. 
Whatever an experiment does give us in this case, an other-things-equal simulation on 
the same question has nothing comparable to offer. If the simulationist were to program 
something to determine the scattering pattern of “alphas” she would be either begging the 
question of how alphas scatter when shot at atoms or, at least indirectly, making use of 
results of previous experiments on that question. For example, previous experiments could 
give support for a hypothesis about the structure of the atom, which then could be relied on in 
the programming of subsequent simulations. There could be a simulation that gave a non-
question-begging answer to the question, but the programmer would have to help herself to 
more background knowledge than the experimenter needed, so that simulation would not be 
epistemically other-things-equal to the experiment.  
The kind of unknown that the advantage of experiment over simulation rests on is a 
key to explaining how experiment can teach us anything at all about the world. These are 
unknowns that play a role in determining the result, but do not themselves need to be known 
ahead of time or even described, or even learned via the experiment, in order for us to 
interpret the results of the experiment as giving an answer to the set question. Geiger and 
Marsden could blackbox the structure of the atom during and after their experiments, as long 
as they knew that what was determining the scattering result was the structure of the atom, 
which they could know in part by insuring that the sheet of metal was made of atoms and was 
only a few atoms thick. The ability to so interpret the results while yet refraining from 
assumptions about some things in the structure of the atom is indeed what allows the results 
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of the experiment to independently test a variety of models of that structure. The results of an 
other-things-equal simulation that posited assumptions for the unknowns about the structure 
of the atom would obviously not provide a test of those assumptions that was independent of 
them, since the results would be in part determined by those assumptions. Interpreting the 
results of the corresponding experiment depends on assumptions, of course, the assumptions 
about what I have called “knowns”. But these are assumptions to which the simulationist also 
helps herself. Holding other things equal, the simulationist must make strictly more 
assumptions in order to give an answer to the question.  
The conditions under which experiments are and are not epistemically superior to 
simulations, according to this argument, divide neatly along the lines of whether there is or is 
not a particular kind of unknowns in the question being investigated.3 We can run this 
argument for the epistemic superiority of an experiment over the other-things-equal 
simulation for any case in which there are elements in the experimenter’s study system that 
affect the results and are unknown. In contrast, if there are no such unknowns then there is 
nothing epistemic to point to that the simulation corresponding to the experiment lacks. If 
there were nothing unknown to us about the structural properties of the atom or alpha 
particles that play a role in determining the deflection of alphas, then since we would ipso 
facto have true beliefs about these matters, the simulationist would have the epistemic means 
to construct a program based on those beliefs that would yield the same results that the 
world, as acted on in the experiment, would give.4 If we know everything about the study 
system that determines the results of an experiment, and can write a program that perfectly 
                                                             
3 The Rutherford scattering example invites a reformulation of my argument in the following form, suggested to 
me by . In a simulation’s program there is an input module, an output module, and a module in between that 
determines what the outputs will be from the inputs. The experimenter’s advantage could then be placed in that 
in-between module, which he gets for free whereas the simulator can only program on the basis of some prior 
knowledge of how the physical system works, which must be based, at least indirectly, on some prior 
experiments. While this is a handy way of thinking about my point, and a good heuristic, the division of the 
programming into the three modules, and locating of the issue in the middle one restricts the point to the special 
case where the only unknowns are in the middle module. In experiments the inputs, for example, alpha 
particles, also may have unknown properties relevant to the outcomes, which the experimenter will not have to 
know ahead of time but the simulator will have to make assumptions about. This is why I prefer to make the 
contrast my argument depends on one between knowns and unknowns wherever they may occur in the system. 
4 It may seem that we do not need to suppose the simulationist has knowledge or even true beliefs about the 
study system in order to avoid epistemic inferiority of simulation to experiment, as long as her simulation will 
yield all the same results as the corresponding experiment would get. Constructing a simulation that mimics the 
experiment’s results without even trying to correctly capture the way the experimental study system works 
would seem to require either a lot of luck or be completely post hoc to the experiment, but leaving that aside 
this scenario violates the other things equal condition by changing the question. To see this, consider what is 
required in order for the experimenter to be giving an answer to the question about what alphas do when shot at 
atoms. He must do preparation that gives reason to believe the study system has atoms set up a few deep. 
Otherwise the results of the experiment tell us only what alphas do when shot at X, where X could be a piece of 
cow dung or asphalt for all we know. So too, a simulation that merely gets to results matching those of the 
scattering experiment can only give an answer to the question what happens when alphas are shot at a substance 
that behaves internally in a way similar to the rules of the program.  
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embodies that knowledge – which is a separate issue – then there is no added epistemic value 
at all in doing the experiment.  
An other-things-equal simulation can be just as good as an experiment, as long as 
there is nothing in the experimental system that affects the results and is unknown to us. This 
is interesting in principle, but something we can be about as sure of as we are of death and 
taxes is that in any physical system there are factors we do not know about that affect the 
results, however slightly. However good our knowledge of the system is, that knowledge is 
never perfect or complete. It follows then that the best simulation real human beings can 
make is never just as good epistemically as the corresponding, other-things-equal, 
experiment on the same question. This is a comparative conclusion, of course, a comparison 
between experiment and simulation on a fixed question, given fixed background knowledge. 
It does not identify any absolute limits on how much or how good is the knowledge 
simulation, or a given simulation, can achieve, and so does not cast general doubt on the 
epistemic usefulness of simulations. The practical consequences this principled conclusion 
does have will be discussed in the last section. 
 
4.  ONE STEP BEHIND 
One might think that this argument supports the view that the advantage of an experiment is 
that its study system is made of the same stuff as the target. Geiger and Marsden had the gold 
itself, where the simulationist has nothing. However, material similarity per se is not essential 
to the argument, for two reasons. 
  First, I focused on the question of internal validity, or verification, of constructing the 
study system (experiment or solver) and knowing that it is doing or measuring what one 
intends, rather than external validity, the justification of extrapolation of the results to other 
like systems. And the problem for the simulator is not that she has something that is inferior 
to matter to work with because it is less similar to the target system, or similar in a different 
way. The problem is that she has nothing at all to use to decide non-arbitrarily how to 
complete the construction of a program that will give an answer to the question, even in the 
study system, unless she relies on some background knowledge that the experimenter does 
not need to have.  
Secondly, though material similarity does give the experimenter a leg up in the ability 
to construct a stand-in that is non-arbitrary, this advantage comes from the fact, well-
described by Guala, that material similarity allows us to infer indirectly that the stand-in is 
answering the question of interest, without knowing how it does this. Matter is not the 
relevant matter, because such indirect support can be gotten by other means, and it is gotten 
regularly in simulations. In a simulation, a solver is constructed using background 
knowledge, a model whose broad assumptions we know and are justified in believing have 
relevant similarities to the target system, but whose consequences for the question of interest, 
and what exactly determines those consequences, are not known. This is exactly analogous to 
knowing that a sample of gold contains what will determine the deflection of alpha particles 
when shot through atoms, without knowing all the structural features of the atom. 
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Both a simulation and an experiment are run in order to draw out the consequences of 
intervention on a study system whose similarity but not all of whose features have been 
established. That is why each method can yield new knowledge. Both kinds of new 
knowledge are unknown consequences of things we already know or are acquainted with, 
one logical, the other physical consequences. The discovery of the logical consequences of a 
set of assumptions and a program is only trivial in the sense Simon’s quote above suggests if 
the discovery of the physical consequences of an intervention on relevant matter is trivial. 
That would be so only if we thought that experiments were trivial.  
It is not because it uses similar matter that experiment is superior to simulation. 
Under the description just given, a simulation can answer its question with an epistemic force 
and informativeness equal to that with which an experiment answers its question. However, 
holding background knowledge constant, a simulation cannot match experimental quality on 
the same question, except in the case where our background knowledge is perfect and 
complete. For every given question there can in principle be imagined both an experiment 
and a simulation that will answer it to equal satisfaction. But the experiment and the 
simulation that answered that question could not be otherwise equal; the simulation would 
have to be supplied more information than the experiment would, in our case information 
about the structure of the atom, in order to get an answer at all. The source of experiment’s 
epistemic superiority to simulation is that simulation is always one step behind. 
 
5.  PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES 
Supposing I am right that experiment is epistemically superior other things equal, why does it 
matter when our options in practice actually are constrained pragmatically and our choices 
are not typically between otherwise equal studies? Obviously, we cannot do a total climate 
experiment that will tell us what we want to know in time for it to be helpful, and should not 
detonate nuclear missiles when we have signed a test ban treaty, or deliberately infect human 
beings with a disease. Why does it matter that these experiments have higher epistemic value 
if it is not possible or ethical to do them anyway? Granted that we can never justify choosing 
simulation on grounds that it is just as good as the experiment, since this is never true, why 
does it matter when often even in cases where the experiment is feasible the simulations we 
can do are good enough for our purposes? 
The choice of simulation cannot rest on an experiment’s lack of epistemic advantage 
but only on that advantage being outweighed by some cost or perceived impossibility. 
Scrupulousness about this point has psychological and thereby practical consequences. Our 
only option is indeed to do the best we can within our budget and moral commitments, but 
budgets and the boundaries of what is possible for us also change in response to our actions. 
After driving a rental sports car one might decide that owning one is worth economizing in 
the rest of one’s life in order to save up for it. An analogous point holds for funding science; 
reducing the number of simulation studies funded might make an experiment on that same 
question affordable. It might not be easy to take this consideration into account in pairwise 
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comparison of the quality and significance of proposed studies, but it could be applied at a 
more global level of choices among funding strategies. 
Not only budgets, but the boundaries of what is possible for us can change, shrinking 
or expanding in response to our actions. There are cases in which we face the choice of 
whether to act to make all future experimentation on a question impossible. Since smallpox 
was eradicated in 1980 it has regularly been proposed that the official remaining stockpiles of 
the variola virus that causes it be destroyed in order to reduce the risk of future infections. In 
recent years studies by the World Health Organization and the American Academies of Arts 
and Sciences have identified specific, medically beneficial research that could not be done if 
we destroyed the last known stockpiles of this virus, because we do not have sufficient 
knowledge of the virus to answer them by simulation.5 But even if we did not know of 
specific, practically salient questions that only experiments could answer for us, the naïve 
intuition is correct that there exist questions that we can only answer with experiments on the 
virus itself, and it would always be rational to take that into account in any decision about 
whether to destroy it. 
What is possible for us can not only shrink by our own hand, but also expand in 
response to our efforts. The boundaries cannot be established a priori. To some it seems that 
they can but such a stance can turn out to be embarrassing, and as Hume pointed out this 
seeming can be explained by habit as easily as by the idea that we have found necessary 
truths:   
Such is the influence of custom, that, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but 
even conceals itself, and seems not to take place, merely because it is found in the 
highest degree. (Hume 1999, 110) 
There are a lot of experiments it seems we cannot do, but it also once seemed impossible to 
see the surface of the moon – until Galileo used a telescope – or to measure the speed of light 
or the density or rotation of the earth. And who would have thought we could do an 
experiment in which the structural properties of an invisible entity like DNA would make 
observable differences? Once we have become accustomed to these as actualities it can be 
easy to forget that they once seemed impossible or even absurd. Science depends on a 
healthy suspicion toward our current perceptions of the boundaries of the possible.  
Perception that the boundaries of the possible are clear has a practical effect on those 
boundaries through the psychological mechanism of motivation. Belief that something is 
                                                             
5 The World Health Assembly was due to decide whether to recommend destroying the stockpiles in 2011 but, 
partly due to these studies, and to what the United States believes it can learn for countering bio-terrorism, 
postponed the decision until 2014. One might think that eradication of the official stockpiles would make the 
medical and bio-terrorism research unnecessary, but it is not known whether there are unofficial stockpiles. 
Most governments lobbying in the decision appear to be committed to destruction of the stockpiles but have 
different preferences about the timetable. 
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impossible does not imply that it is impossible, but does mean that one has no subjective 
reason to make the effort, and thereby that a rational person will not actually make the effort. 
In fact, we may be attracted to believing that a thing is impossible in order to excuse 
ourselves from making the effort. You can’t win if you don’t play, as the lottery people tell 
us, so belief that a thing is impossible prevents us from achieving it, at least with the kind of 
possibility making in science that does not come by luck.  
Surely, it will be objected, one cannot deny that there exist experiments, and many other 
things, that will never be possible for us. Surely there do, and there is no need to deny it, but 
a hazard lies in being sure that we know what they are. 
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